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Ethics and Contemporary American Literature:
Revisiting the Controversy over John Gardner's
On Moral Fiction

Marilyn Edelstein

Santa Clara University

In 1978, the novelist John Gardner published a rather slender treati
called On Moral Fiction in which he claimed that true art must be mor
that little art being produced then was moral and, therefore, that mos
of his contemporaries were either bad artists or not artists at all.' It is

difficult to recall a book about literature and/or ethics-at least one

written by a novelist or poet rather than, say, by William Bennett-tha

has been received with so much hostility, especially among other
writers and artists. Was the hostile response deserved, or is ther
beneath the polemics and diatribes, anything worth listening to
Gardner's call for renewed attention to the ethical obligations an
effects .of fiction or of literature more generally?

The reactions to Gardner's book largely divided along ideologic
lines. Some conservatives and neo-conservatives appreciated his bas

argument that art must be moral and that most contemporary literatu

and criticism were misguided, even if they found the book otherw

flawed (see, e.g., Epstein). Most critics and theorists on the left and mo

of the writers whose work he discussed in the book rejected his arg

ments with disdain. A special 1980 issue of Fiction International include

28 mostly brief, mostly negative, and occasionally scathing respons

to Gardner's book by such writers as John Barth, Raymond Federman,

Gilbert Sorrentino, John Updike2 (although a few less well-know

writers and critics did praise some aspects of the book). In Barth's own

1980 essay, "The Literature of Replenishment," Barth calls On Mor
Fiction a "tract . . . an exercise in literary kneecapping that lump
modernists and postmodernists together without distinction and co

signs us all to Hell with the indiscriminate fervor characteristic of late

converts to the right" (66-67). Many reviewers and most of his pee
responded as a group of parents would if their children's teacher h
written a book called The Joys of Pedophilia. Robert Towers' review

the New York Review of Books was titled "Good Grief!"Although Tower

does suggest we shouldn't dismiss On Moral Fiction altogether, he
criticizes "the puritanical strain underlying Gardner's exhortations
and notes that Gardner "flings about the words 'moral' and 'immor
shamelessly, evoking salvation and hell-fire" (31). Roger Sale's revie
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in the New York Times Book Review was called "Banging on the Table."3

What provoked such strong reactions?

Gardner's book is certainly in the same polemical tradition

Tolstoy's What Is Art?, written in 1897 after Tolstoy's religious conver-

sion. Tolstoy, who Gardner discusses, argued that true art must un
all men in "sonship to God and. .. the brotherhood of man" (150, m
emphases)--either through affirming these true Christian ideals o
through sharing simple, honest human feelings. But Tolstoy was wi
ing to take the consequences of his own theory--consigning his ow

books War and Peace and Anna Karenina to the category of bad art, whil

raising china dolls (and two lesser, didactic stories of his own) to th
pedestal of good art. Gardner's book, on the other hand, was perceiv
by many as self-serving, a forum in which to criticize his peers an

defend his own work (or at least what he wanted his work to be). Ronald
Sukenick called On Moral Fiction "a sort of advertisement for himself

[Gardner]" and thought the best response to the book was to ignore it
("A Writers' Forum," 21). But many "classic" works of literary criticism
by practicing writers, such as Wordsworth's Preface to Lyrical Ballads or

Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent," can also be seen as
primarily explanations, justifications, and/or defenses of the writers'

own work.

The hostile tone of many responses to Gardner's book can be explained in at least three ways: 1) his contemporaries took great offense
at being called immoral or amoral and thus bad writers; 2) many artists,
writers, critics, and theorists, find discussions of morality and art quite
uncomfortable; or 3) the book is weak, flawed, or stupid.4 While there
may be some legitimacy to the third of these explanations, I would like
to focus more on the first two, since I find Gardner's book flawed but
provocative and parts of his argument worth serious attention.
Recent debates about NEA and NEH funding, about public school
curricula, about violence and, even worse, talk shows on television
demonstrate clearly the dangers of judging art solely by rigid and
narrowly defined notions of "the moral." But can one acknowledge the
risks of evaluating literary and artistic works solely by their supposed

moral effects without assuming that discussions of ethics and literature

have no place in discourse, even postmodern discourse, today?
Gardner is right that most critics and theorists, from Plato through

the Romantics, have assumed that literature has-or should have-

moral effects, even if they've disagreed about what those effects may
be. In The Republic, Plato argued that poetry was morally corrupting,

since it was thrice removed from the truth and fostered emotion rather
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than reason. Horace assumed literature could and should teach as well

as delight. In An Apology for Poetry, Sir Philip Sidney defended poetry

against the charges that had been leveled against it by Plato and b
Sidney's contemporary Stephen Gosson. Sidney argued that poetry w

the best of all the arts and sciences for moving readers to virtuous actio

by sweetly revealing the path to it through blending philosophica
precepts with vivid examples. Yet Sidney acknowledged that not a
poets successfully moved and taught their readers.

The idea that art should both instruct and delight persisted in mo

literary and aesthetic theory through at least the end of the eighteenth
century. Gardner argues' that the current critical belief in separating th

aesthetic from the moral is traceable to New Criticism, although

briefly mentions Kant in this regard. I think Kant was a pivotal figure
in this development. In The Critique of Judgment, Kant argues that the

judgment of beauty must be separated from the judgment of the go
(and of the useful).5 Still, post-Kant, in the early nineteenth centur
Romantic poet-critics like Shelley and Wordsworth would argue tha
poetry could have subtle moral effects through awakening imagination
and empathy. But the moral and the aesthetic were severed almost

completely with the rise of aestheticism in the later nineteenth century.6
The foregrounding of the aesthetic or linguistic rather than the ethical

dimensions of literature continued in Modernism and in the various

twentieth-century formalisms (although contra Gardner, I would argue

that New Critics still found "human themes" even in supposed

autonomous verbal icons). Structuralism certainly continued this em
phasis on form, structure, and language; some believe poststructur
ism led to even further evacuation of moral dimensions from litera

theory and criticism.7 Criticism in the twentieth century has been mu

more interpretive and analytical than evaluative (except in the case
book reviews); when value has been an issue, it has been so more oft
in terms of aesthetics (and sometimes politics) than ethics. And it

evaluative criticism linking the aesthetic and the ethical which Gardner

hopes to resuscitate (144-45).

Published at the height of postmodernism in literature, the arts, and
theory, On Moral Fiction could easily be seen as a reactionary text by a

writer longing for return to an at least interrupted if not outmod
tradition. Gardner is, indeed, proud to claim he is taking "the trad

tional view" that "true art is moral: it seeks to improve life, not debase
it" (5). For Gardner, a literary work that is not "serious and beneficial"

is not bad art-it is not art at all (6). He sees much of the work of h

contemporaries, who he claims are often "nihilists, cynics, an

merdistes," as tending toward destruction (6), whereas true art must be
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"life-giving" (15). And certainly many of his contemporaries had rad
cally different ideas from Gardner's about the relation between eth
and aesthetics. Most postmodernists in the 1970's would have echo
Jerry Bumpus in saying "I don't want to improve people with my
writing" ("A Writers' Forum," 129) and followed Vladimir Nabokov
asserting that their books were not didactic and contained no mor
messages.8
Gardner criticizes not only contemporary writers, primarily of fic-

tion, but also the critics who support them, who chatter about

"hermaneutics [sic]" rather than the human (129) or debate the definition of postmodernism while the world goes to hell in a handbasket (7).
Some recent movements in the arts (like conceptual art) and most

contemporary literary theories "evade or suppress moral issues."

Postmodernists, he asserts, "accidentally raise the issue of art's morality

and take the wrong side" (55). But now John Gardner comes along,
wielding Thor's hammer (the overarching metaphor of the book) to
save the day, welcoming the moral back into the fold of critical and

theoretical discourse. Since he believes that "Truth, Goodness, and

Beauty are the fundamental concerns of art and therefore ought to be
the fundamental concerns of criticism" (144), it is only fitting that they

are his own preoccupations.9

Although for Gardner true art is and must be moral, he does not

believe it should be overtly didactic-and this is a major point of

disagreement with Tolstoy. Gardner asserts that artists who set out
with a "predetermined message" are doomed to failure (85). For him,
"the morality of art is ... far less a matter of doctrine than of process"

(91). This view seems similar to Shelley's in "A Defence of Poetry" that
poetry with an explicit moral aim is unlikely to have the moral effect that

can be achieved through its enlarging of the imagination and thus of
the capacity for empathy (328). Art, for Gardner, must discover what it

has to say rather than say what it has already discovered (14). For
Gardner, propaganda masquerading as literature is just as morally
reprehensible as is work that fails to engage seriously any moral issues.

True art, for him, explores moral questions but doesn't preach explicit
moral messages.

Gardner argues that art can be moral in several ways: by holding up
models of virtue and of decent behavior, by celebrating life's potential
with a vision rooted in love (which, for him, Toni Morrison and John
Irving do), by clarifying life, by humanizing its readers, by designing
"visions worth trying to make fact" (100). Moral art must affirm life and
reveal a path to a better possible future.
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Pynchon and John Barth "will die of intellectual blight, academic n
rowness, or fakery" (94).

Gardner does suggest that in Chimera, Barth at least "comes through

as a loving, optimistic man" even though the book is flawed by i
"underestimation of women" and its author's "egoism." Gardner
that "an odd thing about Barth is that he always seems to know wh
wrong with his fiction but never fixes it" (95). A piece like Bart

"Life-Story" illustrates this problem, Gardner says, as it self-reflexive
comments on both the need for and the futility of trying to avoid endl

self-reflexiveness (95-96). Yet, one could argue that this double ges

of both bemoaning and illustrating the inability to transcend one's ow

discourse, is just what the story is about-about the power and limit
fiction, language, and understanding. And an awareness of such po

and limits seems integral to ethics, insofar as ethics concerns

subject's relation to the other.

Gardner does allow that a few of his contemporaries are, indee

moral writers. John Fowles is one of the few well-known recent write

of whom Gardner approves. Even though Fowles' work is often s
conscious, Fowles has convictions and so does his work, Gardner fe

Gardner also praises John Cheever, although not as fervently as he doe

Fowles, for caring about his characters and his readers, and for hav
an affirmative vision. Yet Updike, who explicitly addresses moral
religious concerns, is less successful, Gardner says, since he writ
stories and novels that are "too much like sermons" and not enou
like art, which, he says, must have "an essential and radical openn
to persuasion" (99).
Some writers have enormous talent but do not direct it toward the

right ends, Gardner believes. William Gass, for instance, has the ability

to create vivid characters, to "engage both the reader's emotion and

intellect," but his work, in trying to "prove a theory" of language, winds

up emptying everything out of his work but language (68). Gass and
other postmodernists, who, Gardner claims, are concerned with language over all else or use literary language that is opaque, show a lack
of concern for readers, as well as for morality. Such writers are "mor
in love, on principle, with the sound of words ... than with creating

fictional worlds" (71). Gass, while "the best of [this] lot," is, nonetheless

"stubbornly unreadable" (70).

A more readable-perhaps even too readable-postmodernist fic-

tion writer is Kurt Vonnegut, who, Gardner claims, has "moral energy"
but is too world-weary and uncommitted to maintain it. Gardner criti
cizes Kurt Vonnegut for not caring "enough about his characters to us
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refrain may not reflect cynici
tique of these. Vonnegut has w
after it had been burned in a North Dakota school furnace, that his
works "beg that people be kinder and more responsible than they often

are" (Palm Sunday, 6). Readers may argue about whether this goal is
sincere or successfully achieved, but Gardner does not even consider
the possibility that "so it goes" is used ironically or to achieve a moral

effect.

Gardner contrasts these immoral or amoral contemporary writers
with the great canonical writers of the past-Homer, Sophocles, Virgil,
Dante, Shakespeare, Melville--whose works persist because they are
grounded in a moral vision. Such works, he says, "exert their civilizing
influence century after century" (105). But Gardner believes that in our

own century, because of the unhealthy influence of Nietzsche, Freud,
Sartre, Wittgenstein, literary theory and criticism (from New Criticism

through structuralism and poststructuralism), we have little art or
literature that can celebrate life or lead us toward virtue. In part, this is
because we live in an age of disbelief; for Gardner, it is difficult to take

a properly moral view of art if one does not believe in God or at least
in some non-theological foundation for moral values. Gardner is probably right that "most [many?] contemporary writers are hesitant to
speak of Truth and Beauty, not to mention God-hesitant to speak of
the goodness of man, or the future of the world" (38). Many of us living
in the postmodern age are less confident about the existence or meaning
of these things than Gardner is, but that does not mean they have ceased
to be concerns.10
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For Gardner, the current climate of moral relativism and skepticism

makes bad art inevitable, plentiful, and nearly victorious in its etern
struggle with good art (6). Gardner does not advocate outlawing or
banning bad art, "since morality by compulsion is a fool's moralit
(105-06). Instead he wants critics and artists to expose and reveal th
badness of bad art and to discuss the need and criteria for good, mo
art-as he is doing in this book. Gardner is issuing a call for writers
rethink the goals of their work and for critics to consider not on
aesthetic, linguistic, or political aspects of literary works but also, a
most importantly, their ethical dimension.

One can invoke the good, the true, the beautiful even in a largely
secular world, Gardner argues. Art, he believes, should convey the

good, the true, and the beautiful, even though these are not "things tha

exist in the way llamas do, but values which exist when embodied, an
furthermore, recognized as embodied" (133).

One of the more valuable parts of Gardner's argument is his claim
that these values are neither absolute nor relative. Instead, they a
what he calls "relative absolute values," a phrase which seems oxymoronic but is not. This notion is one that I found intriguing when
first read the book a decade ago and still find useful today.

Gardner's notion of "relative absolutes" is, I would argue, not so

unlike the concept used by a far trendier (and smarter) theorist, Judith

Butler: "contingent foundations." For Butler, traditional (non-conti
gent) foundations (such as theological or philosophical grounds for
moral value claims) "function as the unquestioned and the unquestio

able within any theory." Yet, even from her deconstructive perspective,

"the point is not to do away with foundations, or even to champion
position that goes under the name of anti-foundationalism," but rath
to "expose the foundational premise as a contingent and contestab

presumption" (7). Elsewhere, I have used the term "good enoug

foundations (borrowing D. W. Winnicott's term for mothers) to suggest

that there may be foundational claims, especially for ethics, that ar
always subject to scrutiny and even revision, but can still serve as
grounds for action. Such a "good enough" foundation for ethical pra

tice might include a "belief in love or justice as goods even if their statu

as goods cannot be philosophically demonstrated beyond a shadow
a doubt" (Edelstein, 14). For Gardner, the relativity of "relative abs
lutes" is in relation to all of human history--someday, other absolut

could prevail. But many of us see such relativity (or the contingency of

foundations) as a function of space as well as time-reflecting th

positions, the cultures, and the identities in which we dwell.
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Gardner doesn't despair tha
possible in the world we no
writers-John Fowles, Grace

do seem to search for truth-and Toni Morrison, for whom love is

central." But, Gardner argues, if, under the influence of postmodernism, most writers continue to foreground language, texture, structure,

while backgrounding plot and especially character, and if critics continue to praise these writers, then literature will fail to achieve its
potential as a moral force.

Even though Gardner seems to hold a basically mimetic view of
literature, for him, as for Aristotle and Sidney, literature need not show

how things are but "how things ought to be" (Gardner, 16). It should
ask moral questions, even if moral answers aren't always available.
Gardner believes that the "present scarcity of first-rate art does not
follow from a sickness of society but the other way around-unless,
possibly, the two chase each other's tails." The mutually influential
relationship between the arts and society is certainly more complex
than Gardner's metaphor suggests. For Gardner, though, artists seem
to have a sacred duty to heal society-and it is his duty to remind other
artists of this obligation.

Gardner is "convinced that, once the alarm has been sounded, good
art easily beats out bad" (126), and his book is supposed to be this
wake-up call. And, indeed, since On Moral Fiction appeared, there has
been renewed attention to ethics in/and literature and critical theory.
In the last ten years, we have seen the publication of books such as
Wayne Booth's The Company We Keep: The Ethics of Fiction, Tobin Siebers'
The Ethics of Criticism, J. Hillis Miller's The Ethics of Reading, and David
Parker's Ethics, Theory, and The Novel.'2 Gardner may have anticipated

this important renewal of interest in ethics even if, in 1978, he was a
lone voice crying in the wilderness (as I think he perceived himself).

Yet, his book is substantially different from these later ones in that his

seeks to prescribe how creative writers themselves should write; even
when these more recent books are being prescriptive rather than descriptive, their primary audience is readers and critics, who are accustomed to arguing about how one should read. Perhaps because of both
its tone and its timing, On Moral Fiction has not played a significant role
in recent theoretical discussions of literature and ethics, even though it
has some valuable ideas to contribute to such discussions.

Perhaps Gardner's book was widely decried and has since been
largely ignored not only because of his harsh judgments of his peers

and his era, but because of his limited vision of what moral fiction is.
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There are more ways for a novel or story to be moral, to have mor
effects, than Gardner considers. Jonathan Baumbach, in his critique
Gardner, suggests that "the job of moral fiction ... is to make larg
demands on the reader, to create experiences that trouble his mos
cherished preconceptions, that allow him no easy gratifications, tha
extend his intelligence and enlarge his capacity to feel" ("A Writer
Forum," 6). Many contemporary works (e.g., Lolita, Beloved) raise eth
cal questions even if they don't provide definitive answers, and encouraging readers to ponder ethical issues can itself have an ethical effec
Postmodern fiction can, even through its language and form, also ha
ethical effects. Self-reflexive fiction can encourage readers to thi
deeply about reality, subjectivity, and alterity; even deeply texture
work like Nabokov's or Gass's can defamiliarize language and perce
tion and thus make us more fully aware of ourselves and of the wor

Works that deal with gender or race need not be "propaganda,"
Gardner thinks they are, but can-through plot, character, style---en
gage, as Gardner thinks all moral fiction should, "universal" concer
(love, kinship, death). But many recent writers also manage to retai
and celebrate particularity, historical specificity, and thus avoid t
effacement of difference, the mistaken identification of the particular

(e.g., maleness, whiteness) with the universal. Through exploring bot
difference and commonality, many contemporary writers can provi
a new vision of ethics based on respect for the other (and the otherness

of the other). Many contemporary writers may share Shelley's view
how literature can be moral-by developing the imagination and th

the capacity for empathy and love. I think of recent novels like Barbara

Kingsolver's The Bean Trees and see that life-affirming, aestheticall
successful (and also politically engaged) fiction is possible and that
there is an appreciative audience for it-even if some of us also val

Barth or Barthelme.

Gardner's philosophical analyses of goodness, truth, beauty, and
morality may be imperfect. Gardner may rely on pre-postmodern as-

sumptions-universality, essentialism, and foundationalism-rather

than trying to engage seriously and then refute postmodern critiques
of these. But we don't need to throw Gardner's baby (concern with
ethics) out with the bathwater (the polemics, diatribes, and flawed
judgments in On Moral Fiction). Nor do postmodernists need to throw

the baby (ethics) out with the (Enlightenment) bathwater. Even

postmodernists might embrace, in daily life if not in theoretical treatises, Gardner's notion of morality as "doing what is unselfish, helpful,

kind, and noble-hearted" (23).
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Notes

1. Gardner had been working on the book slowly for many years, even before he
became known as a novelist. Several sections of it had been published already--on
even in Critical Inquiry in 1977.

2. Frederick Exley's judgment there was the most damning and the most succinct: "John Gardner is full of shit" ("A Writers' Forum," 10).

3. For an overview of critical reactions to On Moral Fiction, see Cowart (15-19),

who describes them as "a chorus of denunciation" filled with "contumely from the
parties judged, anger and near hysteria on the part of their apologists" (17, 15). See
also MacCurdy, who provides both an analysis of critical reaction and a history of
Gardner's work on the subject of moral fiction. MacCurdy suggests that On Moral
Fiction "colored everything Gardner published afterwards, as well as the critics'

responses to it"; reviewers often criticized his later work "either for being too
didactic ..., or for not following his critical theory" (136, 139).
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4. Clausen notes that "discussions of literature and ethics make most contem

rary critics squirm in their chairs. The largely dismissive response that greeted J
Gardner's On Moral Fiction when it came out in 1978 was a notable example of

unease" (1).

5. Gardner briefly responds to Kant's argument for the disinterestedness
judgments of beauty by claiming that "art ... is not independent of all interest
beyond all interest" (162).

6. Yet, Vladimir Nabokov claims that even Oscar Wilde, an exemplary aesthe
ist, was among those who "were in reality rank moralists and didacticists" (St
Opinions 33).

7. Some, especially recent, poststructuralist literary theory and criticism d
engage ethical issues, even though such work does not ask the same questions

arrive at the same conclusions that Gardner does. See, for example, Miller's The E
of Reading. Cf. Harpham, esp. 387-94.

8. See, for example, Nabokov's assertion that he "has no social purpose, no mo

message;... I just like composing riddles with elegant solutions" (Strong Opini
16). This is a view he reiterates in many of his infamous forewords, and in t

Afterword to Lolita, in which he contrasts his own views with those of "John R
Jr.," the "editor" he created for Lolita. Ray praises the book's "ethical impact"
"general lesson" (7); in the Afterword, Nabokov argues that, "despite John R
assertion, Lolita has no moral in tow" (316). Palmer suggests that Gardner's boo
a "defense of the tradition for which John Ray is an ironic spokesman" (162); Gar
himself criticizes Nabokov for being concerned with "aesthetic bliss" over all
Yet, Nabokov's views of the relation between ethics and aesthetics are more comp
than they might appear. For instance, in his Lectures on Literature, Nabokov cla
that "a major writer combines these three--storyteller, teacher, enchanter" (5), a
elsewhere he accurately prophesied that future critics would find him "a r
moralist kicking sin, cuffing stupidity ... and assigning sovereign power to tend
ness, talent, and pride" (Strong Opinions 193).

9. Of course, one could easily turn Gardner's ethical standards back upon t
book itself. Written by someone who advocates love, kindness, and respect

others, this is often a remarkably ill-tempered, judgmental, and dogmatic book (e

though at times it is also impassioned, eloquent, and wise). In one rather o
wrought passage, Gardner criticizes "our schools thrown up like barricades in
way of young minds, our brainless fat religions, our ritual of fornicating wit
pretty or even horse-faced strangers" [unless "we" are women]; he claims that
"praise debauchery as pluralism" (100).

10. And many of us would want to expand one of these concerns to "the goodn

of men and women" or "the goodness of human beings." This common problem-us

the male as generic but also as normative and universal-suggests some of

reasons why contemporary theorists, especially feminists, have been skeptica
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ethical effects are limited and
is simplistic and reductive.
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